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Bank Seasoned Equity Offers:
  Do Voluntary & Involuntary Offers Differ?
By O. Emre Ergungor, C. N. V. Krishnan, Ajai K. Singh and Allan A. Zebedee  
 
We examine whether the offer price discount for seasoned equity offers made by undercapitalized banks 
(involuntary issues) is different from those made by banks that were already overcapitalized prior to issue 
announcement (voluntary issues). Voluntary issues are likely made by opportunistic managers at times 
when their stock is overvalued.  For involuntary issues, such timing discretion may be limited. However, 
we find no significant differences in the issue-date discount, and in issue-date abnormal returns between 
the two types of issues. The post-issue long-run returns are positive for both types of issues. Inconsistent 
with prior research, we do not find a significant difference even in the announcement date returns of the 
involuntary and voluntary issues. 
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 Bank Seasoned Equity Offers:  




Several recent papers have examined the impact of the discount at which seasoned equity is 
offered relative to the stock price just preceding the offer date.  Specifically, this body of 
research has examined the market reaction to the offer price discount for utilities and 
industrial issuers.1 The results are that the seasoned equity offering (SEO) issue day price 
reaction is more negative the larger the offer price discount (OPD).  Altinkilic and Hansen 
(2003) argue that the offer price discount is a signaling device that investment bankers use to 
apprise their buy-side clients (the capital suppliers) of the potential quality of the SEO firm, 
based upon the investment bankers’ updated information. 
Prior academic research, including Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), has excluded bank SEOs 
while analyzing the impact of the OPD.  However, bank SEOs provide an interesting setting 
to examine the OPD-effect because Cornett and Tehranian (1994) document that all bank 
issues are not created equal.  They argue that bank SEOs should not be pooled together and 
examined as one non-differentiated group. Cornett and Tehranian segregate seasoned equity 
offers (SEOs) made by banks that are already adequately capitalized from SEOs where the 
issuing institution has fallen below the capital adequacy standard.2 The former are called 
“voluntary” and the latter are labeled “involuntary” SEOs. They argue that voluntary offers 
are possibly made by opportunistic managers, who find their stock overvalued and seek to 
capitalize on that opportunity (a la Myers and Majluf (1984)).  On the other hand, managers 
may have limited discretion to time involuntary offers because such issues are made under 
duress from bank regulators. Consistent with their reasoning, Cornett and Tehranian (1994) 
find that the price reaction to SEO announcements is significantly more negative for 
voluntary offers.   
                                                 
1 Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) examine industrial offers, Singh (1997) examines utilities, and 
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) examine a combination of industrials and utilities.  
2 Banks are required to follow capital adequacy requirements and regulators monitor whether banks 
are adhering to that minimum acceptable standard. 
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 We consider bank SEOs to be particularly interesting because equity offers by industrial 
firms and utilities are not distinguishable into voluntary and involuntary offers. If the 
motivations behind voluntary and involuntary issues are potentially different, it is not 
obvious that the Offer Price Discount (OPD) effect should be the same across the two types 
of offers.  If involuntary offers are made by relatively poorly performing banks then OPD 
may be higher for such offers to compensate the investment bank’s buy-side clients for the 
risk they are taking. If involuntary offers are made at relatively shorter notice under duress 
from the regulators, then again OPD may be higher for such offers. On the other hand, 
investment bankers may set deeper discounts for voluntary offers if such offers are perceived 
as opportunistic action.  Moreover, the information content of the OPD may not be the same 
across the two classes of issues; that is, the market may react differently to the same amount 
of discount across the two types of issues because the poor performance and 
undercapitalization of the involuntary issuers are observable and may already be priced in.  
Thus, the OPD effect for voluntary and involuntary SEOs is an unresolved empirical issue: it 
is not evident whether the OPD effect exists for banks, and it is not obvious if the OPD is 
used as a signaling device, and whether the effect of this signal is different for voluntary and 
involuntary offers.  To resolve these issues, we ask the following question in this paper: Does 
the magnitude and information content of the offer price discount vary across voluntary and 
involuntary issuers? 
Consistent with the literature, we find that the greater the offer price discount (OPD) 
relative to the price on the previous day, the more negative the offer day price reaction.  
Surprisingly, however, we find no significant differences in the issue-date discount, in issue-
date discount surprises, in the market’s reaction to discount surprises, in the 60-day post-
issue abnormal returns run-up, and in the one-year post-issue abnormal returns between 
voluntary and involuntary offers. 
The lack of a difference between the stock price reactions to voluntary and involuntary 
offers at the offer date and in the post-issue period is unexpected, in light of Cornett and 
Tehranian (1994).  To further explore this lack of difference between investors’ reaction to 
voluntary and involuntary offers, we examine the announcement day returns for the two 
classes of bank SEOs, as in Cornett and Tehranian (1994). We find no difference even in the 
announcement day returns between voluntary and involuntary offers. We restrict our study 
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 period to 1983-1989 to match Cornett and Tehranians’ (1994) sample period. For this period, 
we have 60 involuntary bank SEOs and 65 voluntary bank SEOs as compared with Cornett 
and Tehranian’s sample of 59 involuntary offerings and 61 voluntary offerings.  We still find 
no difference in the announcement day returns between voluntary and involuntary offers.  
Also, Cornett and Tehranian argue that the pre-event run-up may be regarded as evidence of 
managerial opportunism to time the SEO of an overvalued stock. Once again, we cannot 
support Cornett and Tehranian (1994).  We find that both involuntary and voluntary SEOs 
are timed after a significant stock price run-up and that the run-up does not differ across the 
two classes of bank SEOs.  If the pre-event run-up is evidence of managerial opportunism 
and ability to time the SEO, then the fact that it does not differ across the two types of bank 
SEOs is evidence that managers are able to time the involuntary offers just as well.    
The examination of one-year post-issue long-run abnormal returns for the two types of 
bank seasoned equity issues reveals two new results.3 The post-issue long-run returns are 
positive for both voluntary and involuntary offerings, and the difference is insignificant. 
Our results do not support the notion that investors react differently to voluntary and 
involuntary SEOs.  Our results do not support Cornett and Tehranian’s findings for our entire 
sample period (1983 – 1999) or for the period employed in their study (1983 – 1989). Our 
results are robust when we limit our attention to large issuers (assets greater than $1 billion) 
and large issues (issue proceeds greater than 1% of total assets). One explanation for our 
finding is the fact that tapping outside equity is an expensive form of raising capital. Banks 
often use alternatives methods to fix their capital adequacy problems, such as restricting asset 
growth.
4 Thus, resorting to an SEO to raise additional equity to meet capital adequacy 
requirements may strike investors in much the same way as they regard SEOs by well-
capitalized banks. 
                                                 
3 We compute the long-run returns in different ways: the Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns and the 
Fama-French factors risk adjusted returns. We lose only one bank that does not survive the twelve-
months following the issue. 
4 These alternative methods include cutting growth, shrinking in size, retaining a larger fraction of 
their earnings, and adjusting their balance sheet towards assets with lower capital charge.  For 
example, a bank can sell its mortgage portfolio and replace it with mortgage-backed securities.  This 
arrangement reduces a bank’s credit risk exposure and cuts its capital charge by more than half (4 
cents for every dollar in mortgages versus 1.6 cents for every dollar in Government Sponsored 
Enterprise backed Mortgage Backed Securities). 
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 A second contribution of our paper is the following. Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) find 
that SEO offer dates are accompanied by a marked increase in trading volume. We also check 
to see if there is an increase in trading volume for bank SEOs and whether it holds across the 
two types of bank offerings. We find that the trading volume increases dramatically at the 
offer date relative to a pre-event “normal” trading volume benchmark. Interestingly, we find 
that although the trading activity reduces within a few days (relative to the immediate post-
issue peak) it stays at abnormally high levels over a 60-day post–offer period and it is 
accompanied by a positive abnormal return in the post-offer period. Again, we do not find 
any difference in the increased trading volume or the post-issue abnormal returns between 
the voluntary and involuntary offers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes our data 
of bank SEOs segregated into voluntary and involuntary issues.  Section 3 analyzes the issue 
date discount, the returns around issues date, the post-issue volume and returns for 
voluntary and involuntary issues.  Section 4 analyses the announcement period returns for 
voluntary and involuntary issues, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Voluntary and Involuntary SEOs 
Our data comprises public issues of seasoned equity made by commercial banks and Bank 
Holding Companies (BHCs) in the United States for the period June 1983 through June 1999. 
The sample starts in June 1983 because the 17 largest banks were first required to comply 
with new capital standards in this month.5 The seasoned common stock offering data are 
taken from the data files of Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum database. The Securities Data 
Company provides offer data on issue type, lead bank identity, announcement date, offer 
date, gross proceeds excluding the overallotment option, offer price, and shares issued. For 
each issuer we search the Lexis-Nexis newswires and the Dow Jones News Retrieval 
Publications Library (DJNR) for articles reporting the announcement of the offer, to confirm 
the announcement date. If the announcement date from our Lexis-Nexis and DJNR search 
differs from that reported in SDC, we use the newswire/DJNR date. We also cross check the 
issuance dates with the Investment Dealer’s Digest (IDD) for issues made until 1996. For 
                                                 
5 See Moulton (1987) and Cornett and Tehranian (1994). 
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 issues made from 1996 onwards, we check the issue date from the EDGAR database of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). If the issue date found from IDD or EDGAR 
differs from that reported by SDC, we use the IDD/EDGAR date.  
Financial statement information needed to calculate the total capital ratios and other 
balance sheet and income statement data are obtained from the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council’s Reports and Income and Condition (call reports) for commercial 
banks and Y-9 statements for BHCs. To calculate the total capital ratios, we use the formulas 
published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the Federal Register 
on January 1st of each year (Title 12 Part 225 Appendix A for BHCs and Part 208 Appendix A 
for commercial banks). After 1989, we use capital adequacy formulas that reflect the risk-
based capital guidelines. Thus, the calculation of the total capital ratio varies from period to 
period, and is different for commercial banks and BHCs. The details on the total capital 
ratios are calculated, period-by-period, for both commercial banks and BHCs (together called 
“banks”), are shown in the Appendix. 
We exclude all shelf offerings, ADRs, secondary offers, and SEOs that have warrants or are 
part of a unit offer. Small offers are deleted from the sample (those under $5 million). After 
these screens, we end up with a sample of 239 SEOs, of which 31 are made by commercial 
banks and 208 by BHCs. Figure 1 shows the number of SEOs made by banks and BHCs in 
our final sample spanning 1983-1999, in chronological order.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
A large number of bank SEOs in 1985-86 resulted from new minimum capital ratio 
requirements of 5.5% imposed in 1985 and 6% imposed in 1986. The reduction in the number 
of issues in the period 1988–90 was due to poor market conditions for new bank issues, 
possibly a consequence of a number of bank failures during this period. Bank SEOs again 
peaked in 1991-92 as banks felt the market pressure to reach the “well-capitalized” zone set 
by FDICIA in 1991. The number of issues drops off subsequently because most banking firms 
appear to have raised the capital required to meet the new capital adequacy requirement. 
We look at the minimum total capital ratio a bank must attain to be considered “well-
capitalized” according to the Federal Reserve guidelines (or “Zone 1” before the “well-
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 capitalized” zone was established by FDICIA). Between 1983 and 1989, this regulatory 
requirement in terms of total capital ratio was 7 percent (also see Cornett and Tehranian 
(1994)). In 1990 and 1991, it was 8 percent. After 1991, it has been set at 10 percent. Banks 
that are below these limits at the end of the quarter preceding the SEO announcement are 
classified as involuntary (IVL) issuers, and those above as voluntary (VL) issuers.  
Thus, VL issues are those made by banks that are under no pressure to raise more equity to 
meet regulatory requirements. IVL issues are those made by banks that are, presumably, 
under pressure to meet capital adequacy norms.  As Cornett and Tehranian (1994) suggest, 
managerial discretion to time such issues may be limited. Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
VL and IVL issues on a year-by-year basis.  
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Figure 2 shows that the bulk of the IVL issues occur in the early 1980’s at the introduction 
of the capital requirements. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our sample of 239 bank 
SEOs. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
The average bank size in our final sample is around $14 billion in total assets, and the 
average SEO size is 1.66 percent of total assets. The average CMR score is around 8, 
indicating that the bank SEOs are brought to the market by high quality investment banks on 
average. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for our sample segregated into VL and IVL 
issues. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
As one would expect, by definition, the total capital ratio is significantly lower for IVL 
issuers, compared to the VL issuers.  The average extent of overcapitalization for the VL 
issuers is 3.45 percent, while the average extent of undercapitalization for IVL issuers is 0.93 
percent of issuer’s total assets immediately before issue announcement. The IVL issuers are 
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 also smaller. A higher proportion of all IVL issues, as compared to the VL issues, are located 
in the Pre-Basel era (1983 - 1987) while a higher proportion of VL issues are located in the 
period 1988 - 1991. 
 
3. Discount, Returns and Volume around Issue Date 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), and Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) examine the discount of 
seasoned equity offer price relative to the stock price just preceding the offer date for utilities 







, where P-1 is closing price on the day before the offering day, and OP is the offer 
price. All stock price and returns data are taken from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the mean Discount is 1.55% for IVL issues and 1.85% for 
the VL issues, both of which are significant. Their difference, however, is statistically 
insignificant. Thus, investment banks seem to offer equity of both the VL and the IVL issuers 
at relatively the same (significant) discount to the last closing price. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
3.1 Discount Surprise 
However, as Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) argue, part of the Discount calculated above 
may have been expected by investors. Discount may be expected to increase with the relative 
amount of the offer (issue size relative to the issuer’s market value of equity (MVE) a week 
before the issue) because of adverse selection and placement pressure. Discount may also be 
higher when the stock price is low because marketing of a low-priced stock may be more 
difficult, or when stock return volatility is high to compensate investors for the risk. Noting 
that issue date discount can be a function of the lead underwriter pedigree, the exchange in 
which the issue is listed, and the issue type (VL or IVL), we calculate discount surprise as the 
residual, eD, of the following regression:  
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                    β8[stdev(-121,-22)] + eD,                      ( 1 )  
 
where, following Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), P-5 is the closing price 5 days before the Issue 
date, and stdev(-121,-22) is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted return in the 100 
day period from 121 days before the issue date through 22 days before the issue date. We 
compute the market-adjusted return on the issue date, MARISS(i,j), as  , where 
r(t) is the stock return and v(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-
weighted market returns. The relative size of the offer is captured by the two variables: 
lnIssue, the natural log of the gross issue proceeds from the offering exclusive of 
overallotment options, and lnMVE, the natural log of the market value of equity as 
computed 7 days before the offer date. The lead underwriter reputation is measured by 
CMR, the Carter-Manaster score, as modified by Ritter and made available on his web site: 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.xls.  We have three dummy variables in the regression 
equation: Nasdaq is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the stock trades on Nasdaq, 
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Panel A of Table 3 shows that the distributions of the discount surprise, eD, are almost 
identical for the VL and IVL issues. Panel B shows that the only significant determinants of 
Discount are the intercept terms (VL and IVL), which are statistically indistinguishable; none 
of the above-mentioned observable variables are.  
We next examine whether the issue date returns are different for VL and IVL issues. 
  
3.2 Returns and Volume around Issue Date 
The issue date returns, MARISS (0,0), are insignificantly different from zero for both VL 
and IVL issues (see Panel A of Table 4). 
 
Table 4 here 
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 To examine if there is a difference in the 60 days post-issue between IVL and VL issues, 
we compute MARISS(1,60) and the post-issue abnormal traded volume, Volume(1, 60), the 
percent excess cumulative traded volume of a stock from the day after the issue date to 60 
days after the issue date, relative to its cumulative traded volume over the 60 day period 
before issue announcement. Panel A of Table 4 show that there is significant price and 
volume run-up in the 60 days post issue for both VL and IVL issues. The post-issue market-
adjusted abnormal return, MARISS(1,60),  is in excess of 6% for IVL issues and over 5% for 
VL issues. MARISS(1,60) are insignificantly different from each other for VL and IVL issues.  
The cumulative traded volume for IVL stocks is over 400% higher in the 60-day post-issue 
period as compared to the 60-day pre-issue period. The cumulative traded volume for VL 
stocks is over 500% higher in the 60-day post-issue period as compared to the 60-day pre-
issue period. We also examine separately banks that have greater than $1 billion in total 
assets at the end of the quarter before the issue announcement (“big” issuers) and “big” 
issues: issue sizes that are greater than 1% of the total assets of a bank. Similar results obtain. 
Panel B and C of Table 4 show the results. Thus, we find that there is a significant trading 
volume build-up and stock prices also increase for both types of bank offers in the post-issue 
period. 
To examine the link between issue-date returns and issue-date discount, we regress 
MARISS (0,0) on the discount surprise. Other factors like the extent of undercapitalization or 
overcapitalization of a bank immediately prior to the issue announcement, or the pedigree of 
the investment bank bringing the issue to the market could influence market reaction to issue 
announcements. Therefore, we control for other possible factors that may influence issue 
date returns using the following regression specification: 
 
MARISS (0,0) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4 VL + β5 eD x IVL + β6 eD x VL +β ’X + ε, 
                                                                   (2) 
 
where eD is the discount surprise. The degree of undercapitalization, UnderCap, is the dollar 
amount of equity capital needed, as a fraction of total assets, to meet the capital requirements 
as of the end of the quarter before the issue announcement. The degree of overcapitalization, 
OverCap, is the dollar amount by which the equity capital exceeds the capital requirements as 
a fraction of total assets, at the end of the quarter before the issue announcement. X is a 
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 vector of control variables that comprises lnAsset, lnIssue, CMR, PreBasel, and Transition. The 
variables, lnIssue and CMR have already been defined before, lnAsset is the natural log of the 
total assets of the issuing bank at the end of the quarter immediately preceding issue 
announcement, PreBasel is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the issue occurred before the 
Basel I capital adequacy regulatory norm was announced in 1988, and Transition is a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 if the issue occurred after the Basel I capital adequacy regulatory 
norm was announced but before its implementation was completed in 1992. 
  Table 5 shows that the only significant determinant of the issue date returns is the issue 
date discount surprise. The bigger the discount surprise, the lower the market-adjusted issue 
date returns, for both VL and IVL issues. Thus, the market reacts significantly negatively to 
t h e  n e w s  o f  d i s c o u n t  o n  i s s u e  d a t e .  T h i s  i s  in line with the results found by others for 
industrials and utilities. 
We formally test whether the VL and IVL coefficients are the same in terms of their effects 
on MARISS (0,0), and find that they are insignificantly different from each other. We account 
for the effects of undercapitalization and overcapitalization by examining how different  [VL 
coefficient + OverCap coefficient x mean(Overcap)] is from [IVL coefficient + UnderCap 
coefficient x mean(Undercap)], and find that VL issues are insignificantly different from IVL 
issues at their respective mean levels of capitalization in terms of the issue date and post-
issue returns. Although the discount surprise effect on issue date returns is significantly 
negative for both VL and IVL issues, it is significantly more so for VL issues than for IVL 
issues. In other words, although both types of issues feature discounts of the same 
magnitude, the information content of discount seems to be more for VL issuers. One likely 
reason is that the undercapitalization of the IVL issuers was observable to the market and 
perhaps these issuers have already been subjected to greater market scrutiny. Consequently, 
there is relatively lower new information content in the offer price discount for IVL issuers. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
To examine the link between post-issue 60-day price and volume run-up, we estimate the 
following regression equation: 
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 MARISS (1,60) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4 VL + β5 eD x IVL +  
                             β6 eD x VL + β7 Volume(1,60) x IVL + β8 Volume(1,60) x VL +β ’X + ε,        (3) 
 
Table 5 shows that there is significant positive relation between the post-issue volume run-
up and abnormal returns, for both VL and IVL issues. As the traded volume increases, the 
abnormal returns also increase significantly in the 60-day period immediately after the issue.  
To summarize, we find that there are no significant differences in the issue date discount 
for VL and IVL issues, no difference in the distributions of discount surprises, no significant 
difference in issue date abnormal returns, no significant differences in the post-issue traded 
volume run-up, and in the post-issue abnormal returns. Does a returns difference manifest 
itself in the long-run? To examine this, we compare the post-issue one-year long-run returns 
for the VL and IVL issues. 6 
 
3.3 Post-Issue 1 year Long-run Returns 
Appropriate measures of long-run returns have been extensively discussed in the literature 
in recent years. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are appealing because the implied 
investment strategy is both simple and representative of the returns a long horizon investor 
might earn. However, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that calendar time 
methods may be less likely to yield spurious rejections of the zero null hypotheses than buy-
and-hold returns, partly because buy-and-hold returns can exaggerate small initial 
differences through compounding. We control for the skewness of Buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns by using skewness-adjusted bootstrapped t-statistics to evaluate significance. We 
also compute FFAR, the Fama-French three-factors-risk-adjusted returns, in addition to 
BHAR, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. We use the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-
weighted market return for the market adjustments.  From investors’ point of view, recent 
work by Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995 and 1996) indicates that a three-factor model of 
risk-adjustments may explain the cross section of stock returns. Their three factors are RM, 
the excess return on the market portfolio, SMB, the return on a zero investment portfolio 
formed by subtracting the return on a small firm portfolio from the return on a big firm 
                                                 
6 We do not compute the long-run returns beyond year 1 to avoid a survivorship bias because several 
banks (47 of the 239) in our sample get delisted beyond one year of the SEO.  
11 
 portfolio, and HML, the return on a zero investment portfolio calculated as the return on a 
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a portfolio of low book-to-
market stocks.7 The Fama-French calendar time series regression model is given by: 
 
                                 rit = ai + bi × RMt + si × SMBt + hi × HMLt + εit,                        (4)               
   
where rit is the excess return on stock or portfolio i over period t, and ε is an error term. The 
coefficients b, s and h are time-invariant risk-loadings. The regression intercept a measures 
the risk-adjusted abnormal return. As Gompers and Lerner (2003) emphasize, it has an 
interpretation analogous to that of Jensen’s alpha in a CAPM framework. 
  The one-year post-issue BHAR(1,12) and FFAR(1,12), computed on a monthly basis from 
one month after the issue to 12 months after the issue, are shown in Panel A of Table 6. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
 Both  BHAR(1,12) and FFAR(1,12) are positive for both VL and IVL issues. That is, both 
the VL and IVL issues outperform the benchmark in the one-year after issue. However, only 
the  BHAR(1,12) for the VL issues are significantly positive as per the skewness-adjusted 
bootstrapped t-statistics. Thus, by the BHAR(1,12) measure, the voluntary issuers outperform 
the market benchmark in the one year after the issue. involuntary issuers do not 
underperform the benchmark. 
  We also examine whether there is a difference between VL and IVL issues in terms of 
post-issue one-year performance, after controlling for other influencers of long-run returns, 
using the following regression specification: 
 
BHAR (1,12) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4 VL + β5 eD x IVL +  
                         β6 eD x VL + β7MARISS(0,0) x IVL + β7MARISS(0,0) x VL + β ’X + ε, 
 
FFAR (1,12) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4 VL + β5 eD x IVL +  
                        β6 eD x VL + β7MARISS(0,0) x IVL + β7MARISS(0,0) x VL + β ’X + ε,    (5) 
 
                                                 
7 We obtain the necessary factor returns from Ken French’s web site at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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 Panel B of Table 6 shows the results. The only explanatory variable that turns out to be 
significant in explaining long- run returns is the extent of overcapitalization of the VL 
issuers.  The more overcapitalized a bank is prior to the issue announcement the better the 
long-run performance. Our results relating to the extent of overcapitalization and long-run 
performance are consistent with Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) who find that “…a positive 
effect of inefficiency on the level of capital is attributable to regulatory pressure on 
underperforming institutions. At the same time, firms with more capital are found to operate 
more efficiently than less well-capitalized banking organizations.” After controlling for other 
possible factors, the voluntary or involuntary nature of the issue itself is not an important 
determinant of long run returns, as evidenced by the insignificance of the VL and IVL 
dummy variables. 
We formally test whether the VL and IVL coefficients are the same, and find that they are 
insignificantly different from each other. We account for the effects of undercapitalization 
and overcapitalization by examining how different [VL coefficient + OverCap coefficient x 
mean(Overcap)] is from [IVL coefficient + UnderCap coefficient x mean(Undercap)], and find 
that VL issues are insignificantly different from IVL issues at their respective mean levels of 
pre-announcement capitalization in terms of the 1-year post-issue performance. We also find 
that VL issues are insignificantly different from IVL issues from the perspective of the offer 
price discount surprise effect on the 1-year post-issue performance.  
We find that there are no significant differences in the issue-date discount, in issue-date 
discount surprises, in issue-date abnormal returns, in the 60-day post-issue traded volume 
and abnormal returns run-up, and in the one-year post issue risk adjusted returns for VL and 
IVL issues. The question then is: Do investors perceive the VL and IVL issues to be different 
when they are announced? Do the investors think that the ability of the management to 
optimally time SEOs is limited in IVL issues as compared to the VL issues? To answer these 




 4. Announcement Date Returns  
We calculate the post-issue abnormal returns, MARAD(i,j) as  , where r(t) is the 
stock return and v(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted 
market returns. Following standard event study methodology, we compute MARAD(-1, +1), 
the market-adjusted announcement period returns from the day before the announcement 
date to the end of the day after the announcement date. We choose a 3-day window because 
some investors might receive information in advance of the formal announcement. It is likely 
that the market is informed after the filing because the filing notice is not always available on 
Dow Jones News Service until a day later (see Irvine and Rosenfeld, 2000). However, we also 
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Cornett and Tehranian (1994) show that investors take into account managerial discretion 
to optimally time equity issues, when they react to SEO announcements. In their sample of 
120 bank SEOs made in the period 1983-1989, they show that the average stock price decline 
in the announcement period for VL issues are significantly negative (market adjusted 
abnormal return = -1.56%), while the announcement period average stock price decline for 
IVL issues is insignificantly different from zero (market adjusted abnormal return = -0.64%).  
We find that the average MARAD(-1,+1) for both IVL and VL issues are significantly 
negative (-0.94% and –1.00% respectively) for the full sample (see Table 7). 8 
 
Table 7 here 
 
Thus, we find that the market reacts significantly negatively to both types of issues. In 
fact, the average abnormal stock price decline is more negative for the IVL issues in the (-3,+3) 
window than for the VL issues, but not significantly so. The average MARAD(-3,+3) is –
1.84% for IVL issues and -0.77% for VL issues. In other words, in contrast to Cornett and 
Tehranian’s findings, we find that equity issue announcements, whether voluntary or 
                                                 
8 We also compute MARAD(-1,+1) as where r(t) =  β1v(t-2) + β2v(t-1) +β3v(t) + β4v(t+1)+ β5v(t+2) 
+ e(t). The results are consistent: MARAD(-1,+1) is -1.22% for IVL issues and -1.11%  for VL issues, not 
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 involuntary, are bad news for current shareholders. We examine the bank SEOs made during 
the period examined by Cornett and Tehranian, 1983-1989. We have slightly more VL and 
IVL issues than the number Cornett and Tehranian had: 1 more IVL issue, and 4 more VL 
issues. We find similar results to what we found with our full sample: the market-adjusted 
abnormal returns around announcement date are significantly negative for both VL and IVL 
issues.  
Thus, our finding is that the market does not seem to distinguish between VL and IVL 
issuers, despite the possibility, as suggested by Cornett and Tehranian (1994), that IVL 
issuers may have had limited discretion to time their issues because of regulatory pressure. 
However, as discussed earlier, the IVL issuers have other means of meeting the capital 
adequacy requirement. For example, undercapitalized banks could manage the asset side of 
their balance sheets. If that is indeed the case, then even the IVL issuers may be deliberately 
choosing to issue stock rather than use other options. In that case, there should be no 
difference in the timing of issues between the VL and IVL issuers. Accordingly, we examine 
the pre-announcement run-up for both VL and IVL issuers. The pre-announcement 
abnormal return run-up, MARAD(-60,-4), is significantly positive for each and statistically 
indistinguishable. 9 Our results suggest that both the VL and IVL issuers time their SEOs after 
a stock price run-up.  
We control for other possible influencers of announcement period returns, and then 
examine market reaction to VL and IVL issues, in a multivariate setting using the following 
regression specifications: 
 
MARAD (-1,+1) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4  VL + β5 MARAD(-60, -4) x IVL +  
                              β6 MARAD(-60, -4)  x VL +β ’X + ε, 
MARAD (-3,+3) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4  VL + β5 MARAD(-60, -4) x IVL +  
                              β6 MARAD(-60, -4) x VL +β ’X + ε,                   ( 6 )  
 
Table 8 here 
 
                                                 
9 This result is consistent with Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian (1998), who document statistically 




 As Table 8 shows, VL issues are not different from IVL issues in terms of the announcement 
date returns, as the VL and IVL dummies show. The result holds for the entire sample as 
well as for the Cornett and Tehranian (1994) sample period. None of the other control 
variables turn out to have any significant effect on MARAD. We formally test whether the VL 
and IVL coefficients are the same, and find that they are insignificantly different from each 
other. We account for the effects of undercapitalization and overcapitalization, and find that 
VL issues are insignificantly different from IVL issues at their respective mean levels of pre-
announcement capitalization in terms of how the market reacts at the time of issue 
announcements. We also find that VL issues are insignificantly different from IVL issues from 
the perspective of how the pre-announcement run-up influences the announcement period 
returns. The conclusion is that the investors do not react differently to voluntary and 
involuntary bank seasoned equity issues 
 
5. Conclusion  
We examine the size and the information content of the offer price discount for seasoned 
equity offerings made by banks.  Cornett and Tehranian (1994) segregate bank seasoned 
equity offers (SEOs) into voluntary and involuntary offers. They contend that involuntary 
issues are made by banks under duress from bank examiners because they are not 
adequately capitalized. Accordingly, the "window of opportunity" or issue timing discretion 
is limited for such offers. On the other hand, voluntary issues are made by already well 
capitalized banks and are likely made by opportunistic managers when their stock is 
overvalued. The objective of this study is to examine whether the offer price discount and the 
associated price effects are different for involuntary offerings from those made by banks that 
are already adequately capitalized prior to the issue announcement. 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), Singh (1997), and Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) have 
examined the price effects of the offer price discounts for industrial firms and utilities’ SEOs 
only.  Our results for bank SEOs are consistent with the findings of prior research. We find 
that the offer price discount and the issue-day price reaction are significant for bank 
seasoned equity offerings as well. However, the offer-price discount, the unanticipated 
component of the discount and/or the issue-day price reaction is not significantly different 
16 
 for involuntary issues as compared to the voluntary issues. This is a surprising finding 
because involuntary offers are more likely to be made by relatively poorly performing banks, 
and by banks that were forced to raise equity capital at short notice to avoid the Prompt 
Corrective Action sanctions imposed by the regulators, for which the discount can be 
expected to be higher. 
Prior literature (Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996), Altinkilic and Hansen (2003)) has 
documented an increase in trade volume at the offer date. We also examine bank stocks 
immediately after the SEO. We find that in the short run post-issue period, the trade volume 
and the stock price moves up significantly for both voluntary issues and involuntary issues.  
We check the immediate offer period through 60-days after the issue.  We find a significant 
stock price and trade volume run-up in the 60-day post-issue period. Intrigued by this result, 
we examine what happens to the stock price in the 12 month period following the SEO. 
Again the results are surprising: the long-run post-issue 1-year buy-and-hold returns and 
risk-adjusted returns are significantly positive. Both the voluntary and the involuntary 
issuers’ stock outperform the benchmark. We believe that these results have not been 
documented before and represent new findings. 
However, we do not find significant differences in the issue-date discount, in issue-date 
discount surprises, in issue-date abnormal returns, in the 60-day post-issue abnormal traded 
volume and abnormal returns run-up, or in the one-year post issue risk adjusted returns for 
voluntary and involuntary issues. It appears as if the market does not perceive the voluntary 
and involuntary issuers to be different.  
These results are surprising in light of Cornett and Tehranian’s (1994) suggestion that 
management’s discretion to optimally time involuntary issues may be more limited than that 
for voluntary issues. In support of this line of reasoning, Cornett and Tehranian find that the 
announcement period abnormal returns are insignificantly different from zero for the 
involuntary issues and significantly negative for voluntary issues. However, we cannot 
support their results upon examining the announcement period market reaction either. Both 
the involuntary issuers and the voluntary issuers experience similar significant negative price 
reaction upon announcement. Thus, our findings do not support the Cornett and Tehranian 
(1994) result.  
17 
 We also find significant stock price run-up prior to issue announcements for both 
voluntary and involuntary issuers: both types of issuers seem to be timing their seasoned 
equity issues. The reason could be that banks that are not adequately capitalized prior to 
issue announcements deliberately choose to issue more equity, instead of electing to meet the 
capital requirements through asset management.  The investors realize that even the 
involuntary issuers can optimally time their equity offerings, and react negatively to both 
types of issuances. The bottom line is that while some equity issues are likely made by 
insiders who do not have the opportunity to optimally exploit “windows of opportunity”, 
voluntary and involuntary bank SEOs are not perceived to be different by the market in this 
respect. 
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Calculations of total capital ratio for Bank Holding Companies 
 
This table shows year-by-year detailed calculations of total capital ratio for bank holding companies. Total capital ratio is (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/ Asset Base. 
Period  Tier 1  Tier 2  Asset Base  Remarks 
Pre-1990  Common stock (CS)  Limited-life preferred stock (LLPS)  Total assets 
(ECM+ECN+PDI+PPS) in Tier 1< 0.333 
Tier 1 
  Perpetual preferred stock (PPS) (restricted) 
Subordinated notes and debentures and unsecured 
long-term debt (SND + LTD)  ALL  (ECM+ECN+PDI) in Tier 1< 0.2 Tier 1 
  Surplus (SU)  MCI + PDI + PPS+ ECM not allowed in Tier 1  Deduct Allocated transfer risk reserves (TRR)  ECM in Tier 1< 0.1 Tier 1 
  Undivided profits (UP)      Tier 2< 0.5 Tier 1 
  Contingency and other capital reserves (CR)      
  Equity commitment notes (ECM) (restricted)       
  Equity contract notes (ECN) (restricted)       
 
Allowance for loan and lease losses 
(exclusive of allocated transfer risk reserves) 
(ALL)      
  Minority Interest (MI)       
  Perpetual debt instruments (PDI) (restricted)      
  Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECM       
  Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECN       
              
1990-1991  CS  NPPS + CPPS not allowed in Tier 1 
Risk-weighted assets (exclusive of IUBS and 
RHCI) 
(NPPS+CPPS) in Tier 1<0.33 
(CS+SU+UP+CR+MI) 
  Noncumulative PPS (NPPS) (restricted)  ALL (restricted)  Deduct ALL in excess of allowed amount in Tier 2 ALL in Tier 2< 0.015 Risk-weighted assets 
  Cumulative PPS (CPPS) (restricted) 
Maturity-weighted Intermediate-term preferred stock 
(ITPS) (restricted)  Deduct Goodwill  (SND+ITPS)< 0.5 Tier 1 - Goodwill 
  SU  Maturity-weighted Long-term preferred stock (LTPS)  Deduct TRR  LTD< 0.5 Tier 1 - Goodwill 
  UP  Maturity-weighted SND (restricted)    Tier 2< Tier 1 - Goodwill 
  CR  Maturity-weighted LTD (restricted)   
Deduct Reciprocal holdings of capital 
instruments (RHCI) of banking 
organizations from Total Capital BUT not 
from components 
  MI      PDI
If Tier 2 excl. IUBS<0.5 IUBS Deduct 
excess IUBS from Tier 1 
  Deduct Goodwill  ECM   
If a bank is engaging in high-risk activities, 
all intangible assets rather than goodwill 
are deducted from Tier 1 
 
Deduct 0.5 Investments in unconsolidated 
banking subsidiaries (IUBS)  ECN     
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1990-1991 
contd    Hybrid capital instruments (HCI)     
    Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECM     
    Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECN     
              Deduct 0.5 IUBS
              
1992  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991 EXCEPT 
      
ALL in Tier 2< 0.0125 Risk-weighted 
assets 
              
1993-1994  Same as 1992 EXCEPT  Same as 1992 EXCEPT  Same as 1992  Same as 1992 EXCEPT 
 
Non-cumulative PPS (NPPS) (now 
unrestricted)  CPPS not allowed in Tier 1   
CPPS in Tier 1<0.33 
(CS+SU+UP+CR+MI+NPPS) 
              
1995-1998  Same as 1993-1995 EXCEPT  Same as 1993-1995 EXCEPT  Same as 1993-1995 EXCEPT  Same as 1993-1995 EXCEPT 
 
Deduct All intangible assets EXCEPT 
Mortgage servicing rights (MSR) (restricted) 
and Purchased credit card relationships 
(PCCR) (restricted)  Include MSR + PCCR excluded from Tier 1 
Deduct All intangible assets EXCEPT MSR and 
PCCR  (SND+ITPS)< 0.5 Tier 1 - Other intangibles 
 
Deduct Deferred tax assets (DTA) (see 
remark)    Deduct Deferred tax assets (DTA) (see remark)  LTD< 0.5 Tier 1 - Other intangibles 
        Tier 2< Tier 1 - Other intangibles 
        (MSR + PCCR) in Tier 1< 0.5 Tier 1 
        PCCR in Tier 1< 0.25 Tier 1 
      
DTA to be realized in the next 12 months 
can be included in Tier 1 upto 10 percent of 
Tier 1 
              
Post-1998    SAME AS 1996-1998 EXCEPT    SAME AS 1996-1998 EXCEPT 
   
Include Unrealized holding gains on equity securities 
(UGE) (restricted)   
Upto 45 percent of UGE may be included 
in Tier 2 
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 Table A.2 
Calculations of total capital ratio for Banks 
 
This table shows year-by-year detailed calculations of total capital ratio for banks. Total capital ratio is (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/ Asset Base. 
 
Period  Tier 1  Tier 2  Asset Base  Remarks 
Pre-1990  Common stock (CS)  Limited-life preferred stock (LLPS)  Average total assets  ECN in Tier 1$<$0.1667 Tier 1 
  Perpetual preferred stock (PPS)  Subordinated notes and debentures (SND) 
Allowance for loan and lease losses 
(exclusive of allocated transfer risk reserves) LLPS and SND in Tier 2$<$ 0.5 Tier 1 
  Surplus (SU)  Equity commitment notes (ECM)  Deduct Goodwill   
  Undivided profits (UP)  Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECM     
  Contingency and other capital reserves (CR)       
  Equity contract notes (ECN)       
 
Allowance for loan and lease losses (exclusive 
of allocated transfer risk reserves) (ALL)       
  Minority Interest (MI)       
         
        
           
Deduct  Goodwill
  Deduct CS and PPS to redeem ECN       
1990-1991  CS ALL (restricted)
Risk-weighted assets (exclusive of ICS and 
RHCI) NPPS<0.25 Tier 1
  Noncumulative PPS (NPPS)  All other PPS 
Deduct ALL in excess of allowed amount in 
Tier 2  ALL <0.0125 Risk-weighted Assets 
   
       
       
   
        
SU
Long-term preferred stock (LTPS)  (original maturity >20 
years) 
Deduct Allocated transfer risk reserves 
(TRR)  (SND+ITPS) < 0.5 Tier 1 net of goodwill 
UP ECN Deduct  Goodwill
Deduct Investments in certain subsidiaries (ICS) 
from total capital but not from components 
CR SND  (restricted)
Deduct Reciprocal holdings of capital instruments 
(RHCI) of banking organizations from Total Capital 
BUT not from components 
MI
Maturity-weighted Intermediate-term preferred stock 
(ITPS) (restricted)    Tier 2 < Tier 1 net of goodwill 
  Deduct Goodwill  Hybrid capital instruments (HCI)     
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1992-1994  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991  Same as 1990-1991 EXCEPT 
      
ALL in Tier 2< 0.0125 Risk-weighted 
assets 
              
1995-1998  Same as 1992-1994 EXCEPT  Same as 1992-1994  Same as 1992-1994 EXCEPT  Same as 1992-1994 EXCEPT 
 
Deduct all intangible assets EXCEPT 
purchased mortgage servicing rights (MSR) 
and purchased credit card relationships 
(PCCR) (restricted)    Deduct All intangible assets EXCEPT MSR and PCCR MSR + PCCR < 0.5 Tier 1 
 
Deduct Deferred tax assets (DTA) (see 
remark)    Deduct Deferred tax assets (DTA) (see remark)  PCCR < 0.25 Tier 1 
      
DTA to be realized in the next 12 
months can be included in Tier 1 upto 
10 percent of Tier 1 
              
Post-1998  Same as 1995-1998  SAME AS 1995-1998 EXCEPT  Same as 1995-1998  Same as 1995-1998 EXCEPT 
   
Include Unrealized holding gains on equity securities 
(UGE) (restricted)   
Upto 45 percent of UGE may be 
included in Tier 2 
        (MSR + PCCR) in Total Capital<Tier 1 
        PCCR < 0.25 Tier 1 
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 Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Bank SEOs 
 
This table shows the average, the median, the minimum and the maximum values of several issue- and issuer-
related variables for our final sample of 239 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) issued by commercial banks and 
bank holding companies in the period 1983-1999. Total Capital Ratio is the ratio of Tier1+Tier2 capital over assets 
as defined in the Appendix. Assets of the issuing bank at the end of the quarter immediately preceding issue 
announcement, Issue Size is the gross issue proceeds from the offering exclusive of overallotment options, CMR is 
the Carter-Manaster score, as modified by Ritter and made available on his web site: 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.xls, PreBasel is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the issue occurred before the 
Basel I capital adequacy regulatory norm was announced in 1988, and Transition is a dummy that takes the value 
of 1 if the issue occurred after the Basel I capital adequacy regulatory norm was announced but before its 











Median Minimum    Maximum 
Total Capital Ratio  11.19% 9.48%  4.05% 26.55% 
Assets ($ mn)  13,941 3,051  40  194,415 
Assets
IssueSize   1.66% 0.97% 0.06%  31.08% 
CMR  7.98 8.83 1.10 9.10 
PreBasel  48.12% 0  0  1 
Transition  17.57% 0  0  1 
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 Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Bank SEOs Segregated into Voluntary and Involuntary Issuers 
 
This table shows the average, the median, the minimum and the maximum values of several issue- and issuer-related variables for our sample of 239 commercial bank and 
bank holding company (together referred to as banks) SEOs, segregated into Voluntary (VL) and Involuntary (IVL) issues. The degree of undercapitalization, UnderCap, is 
the dollar amount of equity capital needed, as a fraction of total assets, to meet the capital requirements as of the end of the quarter before the issue announcement. The 
degree of overcapitalization, OverCap, is the dollar amount by which the equity capital exceeds the capital requirements as a fraction of total assets, at the end of the quarter 
before the issue announcement. 
 
 
Involuntary Sample n = 65 
 
Voluntary Sample n = 174 
  Mean                Median Minimum    Maximum  Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Total Capital Ratio  6.26%                  6.26% 4.05% 9.88% 13.04% 12.40% 7.02% 26.55%
Assets ($ mn)  8,249              1,753 40 173,597    16,068 3,665 61 194,415
Assets
IssueSize
  1.57%                 
                
               
               
                 
                 
0.98% 0.06% 11.13% 1.69% 0.95% 0.07% 31.08%
CMR  7.82 8.33 1.10 9.10 8.04 8.88 1.10 9.10
PreBasel  90.77% 1 0 1   32.18% 0 0 1
Transition  3.08% 0 0 1   22.99% 0 0 1
UnderCap  0.93% 0.80% 0.03% 2.95% N/A N/A N/A N/A
OverCap  N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.45% 2.59% 0.02% 14.37%
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 Table 3 
Discount and Discount Surprise 
This table shows the offer date Discount, the difference between previous day closing price and offer price, divided by 
previous day closing price, and the discount surprise, the residual, eD, of the following regression specification: 




+ β8[stdev(-121,-22)] + eD,  
where VL and IVL are dummy variables indicating whether an issue is voluntary or involuntary, P-5 is the closing price 
5 days before the Issue date, stdev(-121,-22) is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted return in the 100 day period 
from 121 days before the issue date through 22 days before the issue date. Market-adjusted return on the issue date, 
MARISS(i,j), as  , where r(t) is the stock return and v(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market returns. The relative size of the offer is captured by the two variables: 
lnIssue, the natural log of the gross issue proceeds from the offering exclusive of overallotment options, and lnMVE, the 
natural log of the market value of equity as computed 7 days before the offer date. Nasdaq is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the stock trades on Nasdaq, and 0 otherwise. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of Discount 
and Discount Surprise, while Panel B shows the regression coefficients and the standard errors in parenthesis of the 
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Panel A 
  IVL VL 
Difference of 
Means (p-values) 
N 65  174  
MEAN  1.55*** 1.85*** 0.60 
Median 0.00  0.89   
Std. Dev.  4.53  3.73   
Min. -4.65  -3.70   
DISCOUNT 
Max. 32.47  33.06   
N 65  174  
Median  -0.01 -0.01  0.33 
Std. Dev.  0.04  0.04   





Max. 0.32  0.32   
Panel B 
  DISCOUNT 
IVL  0.088 
 (0.040) ** 
VL  0.091 
 (0.040) ** 
lnIssue  0.004 
 (0.004) 
lnMVE  -0.006 
  (0.004) 
CMR  -0.002 
 (0.002) 
Nasdaq  -0.002 
 (0.006) 
1/P-5  -0.114 
 (0.138) 
Stdev(-130,-30)  8.278 
 (5.346) 
Adjusted R2 (%)  16.90 
F-stat  7.08 
Tests: (p-values)   
i) β1 = β2 0.56 





Returns and Volume around Issue Date 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the issue day returns, MARISS(0,0), the 60 days post-issue abnormal returns, 
MARISS(1,60), and the post-issue abnormal traded volume, Volume(1,60), which is the percent excess cumulative traded 
volume of a stock from 1 day after the issue date to 60 days after the issue date, relative to its cumulative traded volume 
over the 60 day period before issue announcement. Panel B shows the distributional statistics of MARISS(0,0), 
MARISS(1,60), and Volume(1,60) for banks that have greater than $1 billion in total assets at the end of the quarter before 
the issue announcement (“big” issuers), and Panel C for “big” issues: issue sizes that are greater than 1% of the total 
assets of a bank.  
 
Panel A – All SEOs 
  IVL VL 
Difference of 
Means (p-values) 
N 65  174  
MEAN  0.07 -0.28  0.37 
Median -0.01  -0.18   
Std. Dev.  2.57  2.60   
Min. -6.42  -7.94   
MARISS (0,0) 
Max. 6.88  9.87   
N 65  174  
MEAN  6.18*** 5.01*** 0.56 
Median 5.41  4.67   
Std. Dev.  10.28  14.70   
Min. -21.07  -29.01   
MARISS (1,60) 
Max. 28.37  98.33   
N 63  172  
MEAN  414.61*** 547.63*** 0.21 
Median 367.53  458.19   
Std. Dev.  654.42  734.41   
Min. -1144.31  -792.10   
VOLUME (1,60) 
Max. 2789.38  4070.67   
Panel B– Big Issuers 
  IVL VL 
Difference of 
Means (p-values) 
N 41  122  
MEAN  -0.04 -0.36  0.37  MARISS (0,0) 
Median 0.02  -0.31   
N 41  122  
MEAN  7.04 5.31  0.48  MARISS (1,60) 
Median 6.27  4.79   
N 41  122  
MEAN  210.64 394.32  0.07  VOLUME (1,60) 
Median 324.47  416.36   
Panel C– Big Issues 
  IVL VL 
Difference of 
Means (p-values) 
N 30  83   
MEAN  0.15 -0.26  0.55  MARISS (0,0) 
Median 0.09  -0.29   
N 30  83   
MEAN  4.89 5.40  0.88  MARISS (1,60) 
Median 4.52  3.99   
N 28  81   
MEAN  764.46 824.39  0.73  VOLUME (1,60) 
Median 645.38  667.10   
*** , **, * respectively denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  significance level. Table 5 
Cross-sectional Regression Analysis:  Returns around Issue Date 
 
This table shows the regression coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) when issue date and the 60-
day post-issue returns are regressed on several issue-specific variables using the following regression 
specifications:   
 
MARISS (0,0) = β1UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4 VL + β5 eD x IVL + β6 eD x VL + β ’X + ε, 
 
MARISS (1,60) = β1UnderCap + β2OverCap + β3IVL + β4VL + β5 eD x IVL + β6 eD x VL +  
                            β7 Volume(1,60) x IVL + β8 Volume(1,60) x VL +β ’X + ε, 
 
X is a vector of CMR, lnAsset, lnIssue, PreBasel, Transition, where lnAsset is the natural log of the total assets of the 
issuing bank at the end of the quarter immediately preceding issue announcement. eD is the Discount surprise. 
The table also shows the adjusted R2 and the F-statistic of the regression.  Test (i) shows the p-value of the test 
with the null H0: β3 =β4 (i.e., IVL vs. VL).  Test (ii) shows whether the difference between VL and IVL issuers is 
significant after controlling for the degree of under/over-capitalization where OverCap  is the average 
overcapitalization in the VL issues and UnderCap  is the average undercapitalization in the IVL issues.  Test (iii) 
shows the p-value of the test with the null H0: β5 =β6 (i.e., eD x IVL versus eD x VL).  Test (iv) shows the p-value of 
the test with the null H0: β7 =β8 (i.e., Volume(1,60) x IVL vs. Volume(1,60) x VL). 
 
 
  MARISS (0,0)  MARISS (1,60) 
UnderCap  -0.296 -2.514 
 (0.454)  (2.526) 
OverCap  0.023 0.720 
 (0.075)  (0.420) * 
IVL  -0.011 0.001 
 (0.011)  (0.073) 
VL  -0.015 -0.073 
 (0.011)  (0.070) 
eD x IVL  -0.121 -0.163 
 (0.068) * (0.382) 
eD x VL  -0.293 -0.286 
 (0.052) *** (0.290) 
Volume(1,60) x IVL   0.005 
   (0.003) * 
Volume(1,60) x VL   0.005 
   (0.001) *** 
Adjusted R2 (%)  13.46  16.90 
F-stat 4.38  4.68 
Tests: (p-values)     
i) β3 = β4  0.47 0.05** 
ii)   β4 
+OverCap *β2 = β3 
+UnderCap *β1 
0.14 0.18 
iii)  β5 = β6  0.04** 0.80 
iv)   β7= β8   0.87 
*** , **, * respectively denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  significance level. 
29 
 Table 6 
Post-Issue one-year Long Run Returns  
 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the 1-year post-issue long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR(1,12)), and the 1-year post-issue Fama-French factors risk adjusted return (FFAR(1,12)) (both computed 
on a monthly basis from the 1st month after the issue to the 12th month after the issue) for voluntary and 
involuntary issues. For BHAR(1,12),  skewness-adjusted  t-statistics are computed and compared against 
bootstrapped critical values (over 1,000 replications) to assess significance. 
 
 
Panel B shows the regression coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) when BHAR(1,12) and 
FFAR(1,12) are regressed on several issuer- and issue-specific variables using the following regression 
specifications:   
 
BHAR (1,12) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4 VL + β5 eD x IVL + β6 eD x VL + 
                        β7MARISS(0,0) x IVL + β8MARISS(0,0) x VL + β ’X + ε, 
 
FFAR (1,12) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4 VL + β5 eD x IVL + β6 eD x VL + 
                        β7MARISS(0,0) x IVL + β8MARISS(0,0) x VL + β ’X + ε, 
 
X is a vector of CMR, lnAsset, lnIssue, PreBasel, Transition. eD is the Discount surprise. The table also shows the 
adjusted R2 and the F-statistic of the regression.  Test (i) shows the p-value of the test with the null H0: β3 =β4 (i.e., 
IVL vs. VL).  Test (ii) shows whether the difference between VL and IVL issuers is significant after controlling for 
the degree of under/over-capitalization where OverCap  is the average overcapitalization in the VL issues and 
UnderCap  is the average undercapitalization in the IVL issues.  Test (iii) shows the p-value of the test with the 
null H0: β5 =β6 (i.e., eD x IVL versus eD x VL).  Test (iv) shows the p-value of the test with the null H0: β7 =β8 (i.e., 
MARISS(0,0) x IVL versus MARISS(0,0) x VL). 
 
 






  IVL VL 
Difference of 
Means (p-values) 
N 65  174  
MEAN  4.97 7.18††† <0.01††† 
Median 4.28  6.72   
Std. Dev.  30.13  27.47   
Min. -45.13  -65.79   
BHAR (1,12) 
Max. 80.10  74.32   
N 65  174  
MEAN  2.93 3.05  0.98 
Median 8.49  0.98   
Std. Dev.  44.49  42.06   
Min. -199.89  -110.21   
FFAR (1,12) 
 
Max. 88.97  187.99   
 
Panel B 
  BHAR(1,12) FFAR(1,12) 
UnderCap  2.797 -8.826 
 (5.171)  (8.096) 
OverCap  2.056 1.164 
 (0.853) ** (1.336) 
IVL  -0.122 0.088 
 (0.129)  (0.203) 
VL  -0.160 0.023 
 (0.125)  (0.196) 
eD x IVL  0.243 0.298 
 (0.788)  (1.233) 
eD x VL  0.212 -1.002 
 (0.646)  (1.011) 
MARISS(0,0) x IVL  0.862 3.593 
 (1.393)  (2.182) 
MARISS(0,0) x VL  1.337 -2.234 
 (0.888)  (1.390) 
Adjusted R2 (%)  10.06  -0.98 
F-stat 3.06  0.82 
Tests: (p-values)     
i) β3 = β4  0.58 0.55 
ii)  β4 +OverCap *β2 =  
β3 +UnderCap *β1 
0.19 1.00 
iii)  β5 = β6  0.98 0.42 
iv)   β7= β8  0.77 0.02*** 
††† denotes significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level using skewness-adjusted t -statistics. The 
skewness-adjusted  t-statistics are computed and compared against bootstrapped critical values (over 1,000 
replications) to assess significance. 
*** , **, * respectively denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  significance level.   
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 Table 7 
Returns around Announcement Date 
 
This Table shows descriptive statistics of the announcement period abnormal returns, MARAD(i,j) as 
, where r(t) is the stock return and v(t) is the contemporaneous CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq 
value-weighted market returns. MARAD(-1, +1) is the market-adjusted announcement period returns from the 
day before the announcement date to the day after the announcement date, MARAD(-3, 3) is the market-adjusted 
announcement period returns from 3 date before announcement date to 3 days after the announcement date, and 
MARAD(-60,-4) is the pre-announcement period abnormal returns from 60 days before issue announcement 
through 4 days before announcement date. The descriptive statistics are shown for voluntary (VL) and 
involuntary (IVL) issues made in all years 1983-1999, as well as for SEOs made in the Cornett and Tehranian (CT) 
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N 65  174    60  65   
MEAN  -0.94** -1.00*** 0.91  -0.89** -1.45*** 0.37 
Median -0.98  -1.19   -1.00  -1.79   
Std. Dev.  3.04  3.84    2.99  3.80   
Min. -7.78  -13.85    -7.78  -13.85   
MARAD (-1,+1) 
Max. 7.67  12.05    7.67  7.72   
N 65  174    60  65   
MEAN  -1.84*** -0.77** 0.13  -1.72*** -2.02*** 0.71 
Median -1.84  -1.00   -1.84  -1.44   
Std. Dev.  4.24  5.09    4.26  4.39   
Min. -10.94  -16.86    -10.94  -16.86   
MARAD (-3,+3) 
Max. 13.88  16.63    13.88  10.20   
N 65  174    60  65   
MEAN  4.98*** 6.39*** 0.52  4.85*** 4.22** 0.79 
Median 5.69  4.54   5.90  3.48   
Std. Dev.  12.51  15.75    10.37  15.39   
Min. -27.39  -23.76    -26.26  -23.76   
MARAD (-60,-4) 
Max. 41.76  80.14    30.26  64.04   
*** , **, * respectively denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  significance level. 
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Table 8 
Cross-sectional Regression Analysis:  Returns around Announcement Date 
 
This table shows the regression coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) when announcement period 
returns are regressed on several issue-specific variables using the following regression specifications:   
 
MARAD (-1,+1) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4  VL + β5 MARAD(-60, -4) x IVL +  
                              β6 MARAD(-60, -4)  x VL +β ’X + ε, 
MARAD (-3,+3) = β1 UnderCap + β2 OverCap + β3 IVL + β4  VL + β5 MARAD(-60, -4) x IVL +  
                              β6 MARAD(-60, -4) x VL +β ’X + ε, 
 
X is a vector of CMR, lnAsset, lnIssue, PreBasel, Transition. The table also shows the adjusted R2 and the F-statistic 
of the regression.    Test (i) shows the p-value of the test with the null H0: ￿3 =β4 (i.e., IVL vs. VL).  Test (ii) shows 
whether the difference between VL and IVL issuers is significant when one controls for the degree of 
under/over-capitalization where OverCap  is the average overcapitalization in the VL sample and UnderCap  is 
the average undercapitalization in the IVL sample.  Test (iii) shows the p-value of the test with the null H0: β5 =β6 
(i.e., MARAD(-60, -4) x IVL vs. MARAD(-60, -4) x VL).  
 
 
  All Observations    CT Years 
  MARAD (-1,+1)  MARAD (-3,+3)   MARAD  (-1,+1)  MARAD (-3,+3) 
UnderCap  -0.316 0.398    -0.018  0.518 
 (0.680)  (0.915)    (0.667)  (0.831) 
OverCap  -0.093 -0.029    0.206  0.290 
 (0.113)  (0.152)    (0.293)  (0.365) 
IVL  0.006 -0.031    0.001  -0.035 
 (0.017)  (0.023)    (0.024)  (0.029) 
VL  0.001 -0.027    -0.008  -0.044 
 (0.016)  (0.022)    (0.024)  (0.030) 
MARAD(-60, -4) 
xIVL  0.000 -0.008    0.017 -0.026 
 (0.037)  (0.049)    (0.045)  (0.056) 
MARAD(-60, -4) x 
VL  0.037 0.023    0.035 0.057 
 (0.018)  (0.024)    (0.029)  (0.036) 
Adjusted R2 (%)  6.47  4.53    8.71  15.88 
F-stat 2.50  2.03    2.33  3.62 
Tests: (p-values)           
i) β3 = β4  0.61 0.79    0.37 0.47 
ii)   β4 +OverCap *β2 




iii)   β5 = β6  0.37 0.57    0.74 0.22 
*** , **, * respectively denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  significance level. 
33 
 Figure 1 
Number of Bank Seasoned Equity Offerings in 1983-1999 
 
This figure shows how many of the 239 bank SEOs in our sample are issued by commercial banks and by bank 























































































 Figure 2 
Voluntary and Involuntary Seasoned Equity Offerings in 1983-1999 
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